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Abstract 
Since the 1970s, the governance of labour market policies in the UK has 
been characterised by New Public Management (NPM) traits and since the 
late 1990s the welfare system has experienced a trend towards activation. 
The current Coalition Government has maintained this focus on activation 
and the national welfare-to-work strategy for the long-term unemployed, the 
Work Programme, follows a similar pattern to that of previous programmes, 
although novel elements aim to tackle some of the criticism of previous 
policies. It has been argued that this increased shift towards activation-
focused welfare policies is changing the governance of public policy towards 
the adoption of a new model inspired by partnership working and 
synonymous with New Public Governance. This paper, through 
documentary evidence and qualitative interviews, compares the Work 
Programme with previous policies with regards to three operational aspects 
–marketisation, service operation, and performance payment– and situates 
it within governance typologies. 
Key words – Work Programme, Governance, Activation 
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Introduction  
 ‘Traditional’ welfare regimes are experiencing a number of challenges: 
economic globalisation, demographic changes, labour market changes, 
processes of differentiation and personalisation, and reduced government 
expenditure (van Berkel and Moller 2002, Taylor-Gooby et al. 2004). The 
last decade has seen discussions on the emergence of a new welfare 
paradigm, activation, which goes beyond the increase of active labour 
market policies (van Berkel and Borghi 2007, Saikku and Karjalainen 2012). 
It has been argued that as a result of an increased shift towards activation-
focused welfare policies which often have to tackle complex, multiple, and 
cumulative issues (McQuaid and Lindsay 2005) the governance of public 
policy is changing towards the adoption of a new model inspired by 
partnership working and synonymous with New Public Governance (NPG). 
According to Saikku and Karjalainen (2012: 300) activation policies have 
transformed the paradigm of the welfare state “from a purely sector-based 
‘silo’ to a multi-sector, joined-up service delivery with its respective 
governance” and require new modes of governance in the more operational 
sense (van Berkel and Borghi 2007). 
Since the 1970s, the governance of labour market policies in the UK has 
been characterised by New Public Management (NPM) traits and since the 
late 1990s the UK welfare system has experienced a trend towards 
activation. The current Coalition Government has maintained this focus on 
activation, within a vision “to open up public services to new providers, 
increase social action and devolve power to local communities” (HC 2011). 
This paper explores the operational/administrative governance of one of the 
Coalition Government’s recent employment policies, the Work Programme, 
which replaces previous national welfare-to-work programmes for the long-
term unemployed and people with disabilities. The aim is to ascertain to 
what extent this latest programme is a completely new intervention or, on 
the contrary, bears much of the same characteristics of previous ones—in 
terms of its aims, how is administered and implemented, and who is 
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responsible for its delivery. This paper does this through the analysis of 
policy, academic, and evaluation documents of previous UK national 
welfare-to-work programmes, and the recent Work Programme with regard 
to three main elements: marketisation; service operation; and performance 
payment. This is complemented with five qualitative interviews with Work 
Programme primes providers and 64 interviews with other service providers 
and stakeholders in England, Scotland, and Wales. These interviews were 
part of a broader research project (LOCALISE)1. Due to anonymity 
guarantees quotes will not be attributed. 
The frameworks of analysis are governance typologies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011, Brookes 2011, Osborne 2009, Martin 2009) and Ehrler’s (2012) New 
Public Management typology. The study of the Work Programme allows us 
to ascertain whether the operation of this particular employment policy 
adheres to New Public Governance (NPG), or whether New Public 
Management (NPM) is still very much alive in employment policymaking 
and delivery: is the Work Programme an attempt towards achieving joined-
up multi-dimensional individualised services as suggested under NPG, or is 
the talk of local responsiveness and partnership-working mainly rhetoric?; is 
the UK still dominated by a NPM model defined by top-down performance 
management, markets and contractualism, or has the interaction between 
NPG and NPM produced a new hybrid form? 
The next section outlines public sector governance, followed by a review of 
recent UK employment policies. Within this context, the remainder of this 
paper analyses the case of the UK’s Work Programme followed by a 
discussion and conclusions. 
Public sector governance  
Countries across Europe have dealt with the challenge of social cohesion 
through different state traditions and various modes of public governance. 
Governance is defined as “public and private interactions taken to solve 
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societal problems and create social opportunities, including the formulation 
and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for 
institutions that enable them” (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005 in Ehrler 2012: 
327). In order to cope with societal and economic changes and challenges 
“reforming governance has become part and parcel of the strategies that 
governments” develop (van Berkel and Borghi 2007: 277). Changes in the 
governance of public policy have been categorised by a number of scholars 
in ‘ideal’ types: each type with specific characteristics regarding its core 
claim and most common coordination mechanisms (Denhardt and Denhardt 
2000; Osborne 2009; Martin 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). It is 
recognised that governance modes are dynamic and seldom found as ideal 
types as they tend to display a hybridisation with mixed delivery models 
(van Berkel and Borghi, 2007; van Berkel et al. 2012b; Saikku and 
Karjalainen 2012). In many cases these mixed delivery models produce 
tensions and contradictions. Three governance types are briefly described 
below (Public Administration - PA, New Public Management – NPM and 
New Public Governance - NPG). 
PA has been characterised as a governance mode that focuses on 
administering a set of rules and guidelines, with a split within public 
administrations between politics and administration; and where public 
bureaucracy had a key role in making and administering policy, but with 
limited discretion. The role of government was seen as a provider of 
services. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, PA was criticised as inefficient, 
gradually leading to its replacement by New Public Management. NPM 
involves an organisational split between policy and administration: the first 
being the domain of policy-makers and the second often dealt with outside 
government. Private-sector management techniques and entrepreneurial 
leadership are adopted within public service organisations, on the 
assumption that this would lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness of 
services. The use of markets in the delivery of public services increases on 
the belief that this would increase choice, create innovation, and deliver 
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improved efficiency and value for money. There was an emphasis on control 
and evaluation of inputs and outputs through performance management. 
The role of government was seen as that of steering, creating the 
mechanisms and incentives structures to achieve policy objectives.  
 
Although most European countries have adopted principles of the NPM, 
approaches to both policy development and policy implementation vary 
(Pollitt et al., 2007, Ehrler, 2012). Ehrler (2012) analysed public agencies 
responsible for the implementation of activation policies in nine countries 
and using fuzzy sets developed a typology of NPM governance based on 
three dimensions: steering by contracts; discretion on the operational level; 
and performance measurement systems. Ehrler’s ideal types are shown in 
table 1.  
Table 1 - Ehrler’s NPM ideal typology 
 
Source: Ehrler (2012)  
 
It has been argued that as a result of the realisation that NPM was not 
delivering the expected outcomes and due to changing socio-economic 
conditions, the governance of labour market policies is changing towards the 
adoption of a new mode of governance inspired by partnership working and 
synonymous with New Public Governance (NPG) or network governance. 
This type of governance has been said (Osborne 2009) to be a highly 
decentralised and more flexible form of management, in which 
‘participatory reforms’ aim to allow citizens and public servants more 
influence in policy-making and implementation. In order to achieve policy 
objectives, coalitions of public, non-profit and private agencies are built to 
meet mutually agreed needs – cooperation between agencies and 
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stakeholders is necessary. Those administering policy are given discretion 
but it is constrained and explicitly accountable. The role of government is 
that of facilitating negotiation and brokering interests amongst interested 
groups.  
UK employment policy 
The UK’s Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) funds labour market 
policies for both short- and long-term unemployed2. The provision of basic, 
job-matching services for the short-term unemployed in the UK has been the 
responsibility of the public employment service - Jobcentre Plus (JCP)- 
which  also contracts out the provision of some services to other 
organisations (Davies 2010). The contracting-out of services for the long 
term unemployed by DWP to private, public or third sector providers has 
been common in the UK. 
Marketisation 
The marketisation of labour market policies in the UK has been undertaken 
since at least the 1970s, with a progression since then towards contracting 
out, competition and targets (Damm 2012). A policy framework to that effect 
was crystallised in the Freud report in 2007, and, in February 2008, the 
DWP published its new commissioning strategy comprising: market 
structure and development, commercial strategy and performance 
management (Hudson et al. 2010). Marketisation of public policy, 
nevertheless, encompasses differences from conventional markets: the state 
remains involved in the financing of services; providers are not necessarily 
private; consumers are not always involved in purchasing (van Berkel et al. 
2012b) – as a result Le Grand (1991) refers to such public service markets as 
quasi-markets. Due to the complexity of public services, these markets are 
more open to dysfunction and inefficiency as they are regulated and unable 
to tap into dynamic forces of real market environments (e.g. 
standardisation, and economies of scale) and information asymmetries are 
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accentuated due to problems of specifying complex services, measuring 
outcomes and attribution of outcomes to interventions. 
The government has praised the role of the third sector in the delivery of 
public services (Davies 2010) and government departments have supported 
an increase in the involvement of private and third sector organisations on 
the delivery of employment services (Freud 2007, DWP 2006). According to 
Davies (2010), a number of studies demonstrate that contracted 
employment provision has not delivered the expected outcomes of increased 
service-user choice, innovation, better customer service, and improved 
performance. Innovation in some cases was focused on reducing operational 
costs and achieving performance efficiencies, while customer services 
(Hudson et al. 2010) remain similar to those of Jobcentre Plus (NAO 2006). 
Evidence on greater quality of services is, at best, weak due to studies often 
comparing different programmes with different target groups, funding and 
conditions. Some studies, however, have found either not association 
between sectors and effectiveness (Davies 2010: 154, Hasluck and Green 
2007), differences being due to variations on job entry definitions, 
flexibility, staff numbers and financial resources (Hales et al. 2003, Hirst et 
al 2002, Griffiths et al. 2005, PRI 2006: all cited in Davies 2010, or the 
public sector in some instances outperforming other sectors (Casebourne et 
al. 2006 cited in Davies 2010). Despite this mixture of evidence, the private 
and third sector have been heralded as delivering better outcomes in 
employment programmes that the public sector (DWP 2006, Freud 2007). 
According to Davies (2010), the availability and quality of evidence makes it 
impossible to claim that the government is using evidence-based policy 
(Cabinet Office 1999b, DWP 2006 Green Paper) with regards to 
marketisation of employment policies.   
Activation 
From the 1990s, active labour market policies (ALMPs) have increased in 
the UK, and these have usually been consistent with Work First approaches 
(Sol and Hoogtanders 2005: 147, Lindsay et al. 2007). ALMPs aim to get 
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unemployed people back into work through: making benefits conditional on 
them improving their employability and seeking work, and providing a 
range of pre-employment services, advice and support to help them do this 
(OECD 2002: 9). The Labour Government from the late 1990s, stated their 
aspiration to create a ‘modern welfare state’ able to ‘enhance national 
competitiveness’ and to support people into employment through ‘welfare-
to-work’ programmes; the introduction of the minimum wage; and in-work 
tax credits (HM Treasury 2005, DWP 2006). The New Deal programmes 
were at the heart of their welfare-to-work. They included advice, training 
and work placements, and incorporated compulsion for some groups that 
was later extended to all new claimants.   
 
The current UK Coalition Government’s welfare policies have continued, in 
some cases accelerated or expanded, some of the previous administration’s 
welfare policies and have introduced a number of new major reforms. 
Central to the government’s welfare reform is the Work Programme, the 
national welfare-to-work programme which has replaced a number of 
previous programmes (Damm 2012, DWP 2012a). Greater conditionality for 
previously inactive groups to participate in paid employment has been 
introduced: this net widening of the activation paradigm follows previous 
government’s changes to the criteria necessary to receive Income Benefit 
and Income Support3. Income protection schemes are being reformed: out-
of-work and in-work benefits are to be amalgamated into a single benefit, 
the Universal Credit, from October 2013. The aim, according to the DWP, is 
to improve work incentives and make support simpler and more 
transparent. Disability Living Allowance will be replaced with Personal 
Independence Payments, and a number of other benefits such as Council 
Tax Benefits, community care grants, crisis loans, Child Benefit, etc. will be 
reformed to some extent, in some cases with maximum limits set.  
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Governance 
If a growing number of individual with multiple, complex, inter-related and 
cumulative issues are going to be effectively activated into participating in 
the labour market, activation policies require to be tailored to local and 
individual specificities. Localism and individualisation will involve 
coordination of various policy areas, a number of service providers, and of 
different policy-making levels. Activation therefore seems to call for greater 
partnership working and network governance.  
The Work Programme 
The Work Programme (WP) is a national welfare-to-work policy for the long 
term unemployed. It replaces previous welfare-to-work programmes such as 
the Flexible New Deal (FND) for long-term unemployed and the Pathways to 
Work (PtW) initiative for those in receipt of health-related benefits. Table 2 
presents a timeline of some of the most recent national welfare-to-work 
initiatives. 
Table 2 - Selected UK activation programme timeline 
 
Source: authors’ depiction 
 
The Work Programme, as others in the past, is mandatory for certain benefit 
claimants4, other claimants can voluntarily be referred to it, but once taking 
part they would be unable to abandon it without being sanctioned (DWP 
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2012a). Service-users do not have a choice of the provider or of the type of 
provision, which reflects van Berkel et al (2012b) analysis that in general 
marketisation does not have impact on the voice and choice of unemployed 
people. The programme is generic in the sense that does not specify different 
services for specific target groups. The FND was also a generic programme, 
which was a change from previous ones such as the 7 distinct New Deals5. 
Marketisation and Contractualisation 
The Work Programme follows the marketisation trend of welfare-to-work 
initiatives. Nevertheless, the process has been novel to some extent due to 
the requirement for organisations tendering to have no less than a £20 
million annual turnover6. Due to this, many private, public and mainly third 
sector organisations7 were unable to compete in the tendering process, and 
it could contribute to a concentration of long-term provision by large, multi-
national organisations. This seems to go against main reasons behind 
marketisation and NPM, such as increase competition and contestability. It 
has been argued that open competition (through partial or full obligatory 
outsourcing) can pose a threat to public providers (van Berkel et al. 2012b) 
and can lead to the squeezing out of third sector organisations (Osborne et 
al. 2012). In the case of the Work Programme, the disadvantaged to smaller 
organisations whether public, private or third sector seemed to be, to a 
limited extent, balance by the DWP requirement and ‘close scrutiny’ of 
tenders’ supply chain of subcontractors when evaluating bids. However 
there are not any further requirements in relation to subcontracting. The 
amount, and terms, of actual sub-contracting has been criticised. 
“The experience overall [in terms of subcontracting] has been poorer 
than the Government said it would be. There was guidance that 30% 
of subcontractors in any Work Programme area should be the third 
sector but that guidance wasn’t taken into account in the scoring of 
the bids so [in some areas] providers had 6% and 8%, so way short 
of a 30% target and that’s not monitored, it’s not being pushed by 
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government, so the third sector isn’t getting the share of the Work 
Programme that the Government set out”.  
Related to this, concerns have been raised regarding the Work Programme’s 
lack of specification on the use of suppliers (Simmonds 2011) and the 
distribution of financial risk between primes and subcontractors (Mulheirn 
2011). Evaluations of PtW and FND showed relatively few referrals to 
subcontractors by primes (Hudson et al. 2010) and unfair distributions of 
risk between primes and subcontractors (Robert and Simmonds 2011). 
There is a lack of information regarding the Work Programme (Simmonds 
2011), although the recent DWP evaluation report (Newton et al. 2012) 
found a considerable variation on the use of subcontractors and hinted to 
the low use of ‘paid-for spot providers’ either due to low participant 
numbers with specialist needs or due to providers minimising external cost. 
Of primes interviewed there was a mixture of the level of provision being 
outsourced, whether that was end-to-end8 services or spot-purchase 
services. Outsourcing was, in most cases, a result of the prime not having a 
physical presence in a geographic area, specific expertise, or being higher 
cost or lower effectiveness than sub-contractors. The DWP evaluation did 
not find innovative practices yet in the used of referrals (Newton et al. 2012). 
Interviews with stakeholders show different experiences of subcontracting: 
those reporting negative experiences tend to cite low level of referrals and 
uncertainty regarding payments with some, as a result, seeking to establish 
service level agreements. 
“We were named within [one of the primes’] bid; we have yet to see 
anything from that ... We have had countless meetings with them 
and at one point they say that they just wanted to do spot-purchases 
... I would like to develop a SLA [Service Level Agreement] ... as 
supposed to this sort of piece meal way of saying that we will spot-
purchase, which doesn’t give us any security whatsoever and 
actually doesn’t mean that they have to do anything specific for [the 
target group we support]”. 
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A number of third sector organisations chose not to be part of, or withdrew 
from, supply chains while a few others were not approached by tendering 
organisations. 
After tendering for the Programme in January 2011, 18 organisations were 
awarded 40 contracts (DWP 2012c) in the UK (those organisation will be 
referred to from now on as ‘prime providers’ or ‘primes’). Of these, 15 were 
private companies, the other three were a public sector organisation, a 
mixed private/third sector, and a third sector organisation (with some 
private sector backing secured (Giotis 2011 in Damm 2012)). These 
providers deliver services in 18 areas in the UK: 4 areas have 3 providers 
each and 14 areas have 2 providers each (DWP 2012b). Primes operate in 
competition with at least one other prime provider. This arrangement is 
similar to the FND contract model called ‘choice district’ where two 
contractors delivered the programme (Vegeris et al., 2010). The rational 
given for maintaining competition during service delivery follows the same 
principles that encouraged marketisation: increasing innovation, better 
customer service and improved performance (greater efficiency and 
effectiveness). JCP refers service users to contractors in a 50:50 systematic 
and unbiased way, which differs from a more unsystematic referral process 
in the FND (Vegeris et al. 2010). This enables the DWP to compare 
performance among prime contractors and potentially alter future allocation 
of resources9.  
Contracts are for five years, which could be extended another 2 years. 
Increase contract length deals with one of the criticism made against 
welfare-to-work programmes, which were seen generally as too short to 
support service-users and provided less economic sense for providers and 
for the commissioning side (Hudson et al. 2010: 42). Participants are in the 
programme for a maximum of 2 years, which some consider too short to 
deal with those furthers away from the labour market. 
14 
 
Service Operation: the black-box approach 
The DWP has not placed any procedural requirements on primes delivering 
the Work Programme, except for a minimum service delivery standard10 
(DWP nd). According to Newton et al (2012) minimum standards were in 
cases vague and varied in terms of being universally applied to all service-
users or to a specified minimum number. DWP’s relation to the service 
delivery process has been defined as a ‘black-box’ approach, which although 
also mentioned in PtW (Hudson et al. 2010: 2) and in the FND (Vegeris et 
al. 2010), was over-specified according to the DWP (nd). Therefore the Work 
Programme implies a step towards increasing discretion in service delivery. 
It is argued that this flexibility will allow provision to account for local 
factors and individuals’ needs with more personalisation and tailor-made 
services. It is still uncertain how this is being implemented in the Work 
Programme due to lack of publicly available data. Nevertheless the recent 
evaluation (Newton et al. 2012) finds that most providers interviewed use a 
standard streamed approach based on service-users distance to the labour 
market (major barriers to work, moderate barriers to work, and job-ready or 
RAG (red, amber, green)-rating), while personalisation took place within 
streams. According to the report’s finding procedural personalisation was 
more common than substantial personalisation (which encompasses human 
capital approaches to service delivery).  
Failure by individuals to cooperate or take part in the Work Programme and 
related activities, including refusing or leaving training, can result in benefit 
sanctions being imposed by Benefits Delivery Centres. Due to the nature of 
many service-users, concerns have been raised that primes are unlikely to be 
able to support those with multiple barriers (Newton et al. 2012), as they do 
not have the necessary expertise and are unlikely to source suitable sources 
of expertise (Damm 2012). If the issue is a lack of expertise, subcontracting 
and supply chains could be a solution, but, as mentioned previously, there 
are concerns about the level of subcontracting. Hudson et al. (2010) found 
that in PtW there was a lack of the necessary skills reported by the advisers 
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to deal with the complex needs of some service-users and that there was a 
“fine balance” between meeting customers’ needs and meeting employment 
targets: while some services were perceived as of benefit to customers, 
primes could not justify paying for those if they did not directly relate to job 
outcome targets (2010: 43). The recent evaluation of the Work Programme 
finds that although individual barriers are identify, adequate support is not 
always possible due to lack of time, prioritisation on those more job-ready, 
lack of funding, and/or the serious, complex and cumulative nature of the 
barriers (Newton et al. 2012). This and the fact that primes could be 
developing specialist services in-house raised concerns that specialist service 
providers would be squeeze out (Osborne et al. 2012, Damm 2012).  
“It is very much a contract on the cheap and the people who lose out 
from that are not ...  we have lost out,  but it’s more the customers 
and my estimate is that compared with previous DWP programmes, 
we are trying to deal with long-term unemployed, often with a 
range of issues for probably about a third of the cost of what we 
were, say five or six years ago in a situation where the economy was 
more buoyant. It’s not easy to make the sub-contracts to work 
financially, they’re not contracts that we feel confident that we’ll 
make a profit – we are like any other business, we have to make a 
profit on a contract – so the Work Programme sub-contracting is 
not easy at the moment 
According to those interviewed, the Work Programme prime providers in 
Scotland and Wales are, to a large extend, unable to access services funded 
by the government and/or by European Social Funds (e.g. training courses, 
careers guidance, debt advice, etc.) unless the primes pay for those services. 
The combination of NPM and a multi-level governance environment has 
produced inefficiencies and negative impacts on service quality. The reasons 
given by devolved governments for this proscription are the need to achieve 
additionality and to avoid duplication. Third sector organisations could be 
subsidising some of the work of primes, and although this is an area where 
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there has not been clear evidence to date, PtW providers mentioned using 
services of organisations that were already funded and Newton et al (2012) 
found that the majority of referrals were to provision already funded. It was 
stressed by some interviewees, that the Work Programme is unable, and was 
never intended, to fund some of these services. It is envisaged that 
clarification from central government will be needed with regards to what 
the Work Programme is expected to fund, and to what extend that is 
feasible.  
Performance Payment  
The relationship between the purchaser (DWP) and the providers (primes), 
in recent welfare-to-work initiatives including the Work Programme, is 
characteristic of NPM. The Work Programme nevertheless introduces a 
number of novel elements. First the budget to fund payment to contractors 
comes from future savings in the Annually Manage Expenditure, which is 
the amount spent in benefits, rather than from the Departmental 
Expenditure Limit which is the DWP’s maximum annual expenditure budget 
(Ingeus nd). Second, the criterion that providers need to meet to draw full 
payment is also novel and should be beneficial. Work Programme primes, 
similarly to PtW primes, receive an attachment fee for every service-user, a 
job-outcome payment 26 or 13 weeks after entry into work (depending on 
user group), and after that sustainment payment every four weeks to a 
maximum of 13, 20 o 26 payments (52, 80 and 104 weeks respectively) 
depending on user group (DWP 2012c). While the FND and PtW payment 
by job-outcome included a sustainability condition (13 weeks and 26 weeks 
respectively) which specifically encouraged the placement of people in more 
sustainable jobs, and the support of service-users during their early period 
in employment; the Work Programme sustainability requirement is greatly 
extended. Arguably this is a departure from the work-first approach in 
welfare-to-work policies, due to unsustainable jobs not being cost-effective 
to the contractor: exit from employment means a return to the Work 
Programme but the primes would not get attachment fee or job outcome fee 
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for that service-user. It should also encourage contractors to assist those 
who are in a job but lose it during the period covered, hence avoiding some 
pressures to put people into ‘any’ job. Sustainability requires a more careful 
consideration of individual’s barriers to employment, the need to consider 
appropriate jobs for that individual, and provide in-work follow up and 
support if require. It will be important to ensure that the sustainability 
criteria are not loosened, for example due to poor local economic 
circumstances, as this may negate some of the beneficial effects of this policy 
innovation. 
Another interesting, although not entirely new (Newton et al. 2012), feature 
of the programme is the differential payments that primes receive 
depending on the benefit type that the service-user is claiming11 (DWP 
2012a). In PtW, providers were given guidelines as to the percentage of 
service-users from the hardest to help group that they were expected to 
support (70%). Payment differentials according to service-users groups was 
recommended by Hudson et al. (2010: 66) in order to support providers 
engaging with the hardest to help12. Payment differentials attempt to tackle 
the ‘creaming’ (of service-users easier to help) and ‘parking’ (of service-users 
hardest to help) that activation programmes, especially those with outcome-
based payments, tended to deliver (Casebourne et al. 2006, cited in Davies 
2010).  
“The differentiating tariff that customers attract has been designed, 
in some way, to mitigate the creaming and parking, and certainly 
everyone that has done their financial modelling would be focusing 
on getting those customers with the high tariff into work”.  
It has been argued that even with differential payments those easiest to help 
will still be supported first, and that those hardest to help will received 
relatively less resources in terms of money and staff (Damm 2012: 13) and 
that the hardest to help will not receive the long-term interventions required 
because outcome-based funding is not adequate for providing that type of 
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intervention (Davies 2010, Hudson et al. 2010). Newton et al (2012: 27) in 
their evaluation found that “the structure of outcome payments strongly 
influence expenditure in many of these organisation” with higher 
expenditure elicited when a job outcome was “guaranteed or seemed very 
likely”. In many cases it was stated that service-users with less barriers will 
attract higher expenditure (Newton et al. 2012). These together with the 
finding that those with multiple barriers tended to be seen with less 
frequency, seems to show a tendency, although still early days, to cream and 
park in the Work Programme. 
Competitive contractualisation has been accused of creating unrealistic 
targets set up by providers in order to win contracts (Damm 2012) as 
funding decisions tend to be based on cost (Osborne et al 2012, Simmonds 
2011). In PtW, parameters of contract were not considered feasible due to 
the economic crisis (with employers not committing to job placements, 
higher competition in the labour market): providers were not meeting 
performance targets and service fees were not sufficient to cover running 
costs (Hudson et al. 2010). It has been argued that the Work Programme 
minimum level of job-entry rates, around 30 per cent in year 3 of the 
programme, is too high13 (Mulheim 2011). Recent figures for the Work 
Programme show that results still far off the target (DWP 2012c). Mulheim 
(2011) highlighted that due the overestimated performance, outcome 
payments could be too low to be financially viable. Prime providers during 
the interviews seemed positive about the contact’s finances and about 
achievable outcomes. According to them, the number of people predicted to 
go into the Work Programme has increase dramatically (around doubled). 
“I think at this stage we are probably 35% over and above the flows 
that we expected, I think this time next year we could be 45% over ... 
I thought that at the time of the tenders you could probably have 
expected 38 or 40% of people to go into work, since then, where the 
economy is at now, I think that a reasonable assumption would be 
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30%. If you track that over the next couple of years, then starts 
going down even further”.  
The DWP performance management of Work Programme primes is done 
through the outcome-based payment and, similar to PtW, there is not 
performance management of subcontractors (Hudson et al. 2010: 30). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
How does the Work Programme compare to previous welfare-to-
work programmes 
Many features of the Work Programme were already present in previous 
welfare-to-work programmes, although there are a number of novel 
elements. Table 3 compares three welfare-to-work programmes with regards 
to the three elements this paper focuses on. The scale of the Work 
Programme (i.e. the large service areas and the expected numbers of services 
users) and the annual turnover criteria that providers are required to have 
(due to the scale of the programme and to the payment method), means that 
the marketisation process in this employment policy excluded a number of 
providers, not by virtue of the quality or cost of their services but by virtue of 
size. 
Novel elements are also the funding coming from savings to the public 
budget, full payment to primes been tied to increased job sustainability 
length, and differential payments by benefit group. These elements could 
tackled some of the criticisms levelled against welfare-to-work policies, 
namely: that job entry payments in the past did not lead to sustainable jobs 
but created a revolving door of employment/unemployment; that payment 
by job-entry tended to facilitate ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ to the 
disadvantaged of those furthest away from the labour market and risk of 
deadweight (i.e. those results would have been achieved without the policy). 
These new elements have also transferred greater risk to the prime 
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providers, with some arguing that the finances of the Work Programme are 
not sustainable. 
The relation between the purchaser (DWP) and providers has become less 
prescriptive in terms of service delivery, with the providers being able to 
devise actions and processes: a ‘black-box’ approach. The ‘black-box’ 
approach aims to increase flexibility that should, it is claimed, allow 
individualisation and effectiveness in service provision. A lack of published 
research makes it impossible to ascertain the level of individualised and 
localisation. There are a number of concerns in relation to providers being 
unable, or unwilling due to practicalities, to meet specialist needs of service-
users. Similarly, there is some evidence, although more research is needed, 
that subcontractors (including local third sector organisations) have not 
received the number of referrals expected. This could be the result of service 
models taking longer than expected to be established, primes unable to 
referred service-users, or because services are being developed and delivered 
in-house. The latter could be a new development where, as an interview put 
it, “mono-cultures” are created. These hyper-primes not only provide case 
management and core services, but deliver in-house health services 
(including psychologist, physiotherapist), debt and financial advice, 
counselling, drug and alcohol support, literacy and numeracy skills, etc. 
Table 3 - Characteristics of three welfare-to-work programmes with relation to 
three operational elements: marketisation and contractualisation; performance 
payment; service operation 
 
Source: authors’ depiction  
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Does the Work Programme show any signs of New Public 
Governance 
The Work Programme retains many of the NPM characteristics, and there 
seems to be little evidence of NPG in its operation or delivery, despite the 
considerable potential, or actual, use of sub-contractors. The introduction of 
differential and sustainable payments could be a balance against creaming 
and parking and could promote values of equality and fairness and increase 
efficiency and value for money. This is not new, as previous programmes 
placed constrains on providers either through outcomes-base payments or 
process requirements. 
The ‘black-box’ approach has potential to allow contractors to individualise 
and localise service provision. It could produce cooperation between 
agencies, organisation, employers, etc. at local level to the benefit of service-
users; or it could create hyper-primes to the benefit or detriment of service-
users although it goes against some of the core principles of and 
justifications for NPM. There is a present not enough information to 
ascertain at what is happening in reality.  
The Work Programme has the potential for partnership working between 
primes and subcontractors, and between primes and other service providers 
in the local area; unfortunately for a number of reasons the use of 
subcontractors seem to be lower than expected and perhaps desirable for 
some service-users. According to Saikku and Karjalainen (2012: 304) New 
Public Governance presents some challenges such as joint decision-making 
and target setting, end of separate financing, management and 
accountability. Challenges to NPG are also coming from NPM and in some 
cases PA operational structures still in place.  
With the information available, the Work Programme can be representative 
of NPM type governance. Using Ehrler’s typology, the Work Programme is a 
different type of New Public Management when compare to the operation of 
the Public Employment Service, which Ehrler classifies as centralised. The 
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Work Programme can be argued is nearer to a business type NPM, with high 
performance measurement and contract steering (as the Public Employment 
Service) and where operational discretion is high (Table 4), which was low in 
the Public Employment services. It can be argued that any centralised 
tendency of previous welfare-to-work programmes (due to them being ‘over-
specified’) has been, to some extent, removed in the Work Programme. 
Table 4 - Characteristics of the governance of Work Programme based on Ehrler’s 
ideal NPM types 
 
Source: authors’ depiction based on Ehrler (2012) 
Further research 
The Work Programme is still a relatively new policy and it will be some time 
before sufficient information on its operation, and its operation in different 
economic conditions, is available in order to carry out in-depth research. 
Recent and future planned DWP evaluations of the Work Programme are 
welcomed. The changing relationships between prime- and sub-contracts 
and the implications of this for local governance also requires further 
research. Further, there is a wide need for research on the effectiveness and 
efficiencies of the Work Programme, how it has changed the balance of 
power between employability service providers (e.g. towards large firms) 
and smaller sub-contractors or competitor and, especially in the longer 
term, with the JCP and government (as expertise, resources, etc. become 
more concentrated on relatively fewer suppliers and less so in the JCP and 
among smaller firms).  It is still unclear if the Work Programme will 
incorporate more New Public Governance characteristics. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 LOCALISE is a European seventh framework project – further information at www.localise-research.eu. The 
research leading to these results received funding from the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) 
under grant agreement no. 266768. 
2 Long-term unemployed are classified as those aged 25 and over and unemployed for 12 months or more, and 
those under 25 unemployed for 9 months or more 
3 (a) From November 2008 lone parents with a youngest child age 12 or over, lost entitlement to Income 
Support (with a transfer to either Jobseekers Allowance or Employment Support Allowance). The age of the 
youngest child was to be reduced to 7 from October 2010; the Coalition Government in June 2010 announce 
that from 2012 it would be lowered to 5. (b) The Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) was introduced in 
October 2008, and was to replace Income Benefit (IB) and Income Support (IS) received on grounds of ill-
health. New claimants have to undergo a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) and are assigned to either 
Jobseekers Allowance if they are found ‘fit to work’ or to the Employment and Support Allowance Work 
Related Activity Group or the Support Group; those already in receipt of either of these benefits are re-
assessed. 
4 The long-term unemployed; individuals receiving Jobseekers Allowance and which are seriously 
disadvantaged including those that have recently received IB can be required to take part in the Work 
Programme after 3 months; and individuals receiving ESA in the Work Related Activity Group when close to 
being fit for work. 
5 New Deal for lone parent, for young people, for 25+, for 50+, for disabled people, for partners, and for 
musicians - for details in each of them see Stafford and Kellard (2007). 
6 The DWP launched an invitation to tender in August 2010 for organisations to be considered for the 
Framework for the Provision of Employment Related Support Services (Framework). One of the criteria to be 
considered for this Framework was to have a turnover of no less than £20 million per annum, unless robust 
evidence is supply that organisation can manage a £10 million annual value of the Work Programme as per the 
reward model. Successful bidders to the Framework were announced in November 2010 and in January 2011 
they were invited to tender (ITT) for the Work Programme which commenced in June 2011. 
7 The concept of third sector organisations in this paper includes voluntary, charitable, non-for profit 
organisations. 
8 Providers that aim to support participants from the point of referrals to the end of the programme (Newton et 
al 2012). 
9 The contractor with best performance will be rewarded with incentive payments and a 5% increase in referrals 
each year from the second year of the contract (and possibly the solo Work Programme contract in the future). 
10 As well as Minimum Service Delivery (DWP nd) a requirement by the DWP is that primes will have a 
minimum contact with every service-user every two weeks. 
11 a total of £3,800 for a young person (the minimum amount is £3,700) to a total of £13,700 (maximum 
amount) for those receiving Employment and Support Allowance in the Support Group and that had recently 
received Incapacity Benefit (DWP 2012a). 
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12 Another alternative suggestion was paying providers on a wider range of outcomes. 
13 10% higher than what the New Deals achieved in more favourable economic conditions (Damm, 2012). 
